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Abstract
We conduct online ﬁeld experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose
prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers,
(2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by
the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52 percent
relative to random strangers, while future interaction e ects increase giving by an additional
24 percent when giving is socially e cient. This ﬁnding suggests that future interaction a ects
giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting e ciency-
enhancing favors. We also ﬁnd that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with
higher baseline altruism.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C73, C91, D64
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Real world social networks provide a natural laboratory to study prosocial behavior. Friends help
each other frequently and often substantially. In the 1995 General Social Survey, 55 percent of
Americans report they ﬁrst approach close friends and family members when they need to borrow
a large sum of money (Karlan, Mobius, Szeidl, and Rosenblat 2008). In a 2007 UK YouGov survey,
48 percent of respondents reported lending, on average, $1,800 to friends and relatives during the
past 12 months (YouGov 2007). Similarly, close friends and relatives are the predominant source of
informal insurance against risk in developing countries (Townsend 1994, Udry 1994).
Economists have explored two main explanations of prosocial behavior – selﬂess altruism and
expectations of reciprocal favors in future exchanges. Since people tend to interact frequently with
friends toward whom they have the strongest altruistic feelings, these mechanisms are di cult to
distinguish empirically.1 In this paper, we use two online ﬁeld experiments in a real world social
network to solve this identiﬁcation problem. Our design allows us to selectively switch o  the
reciprocity mechanism in some treatments, and thereby separately measure the strength of the
altruism and reciprocity mechanisms.
The ability of our methodology to distinguish between these two mechanisms has several ap-
plications. For example, many researchers have documented that as societies transition to market
economies, market transactions replace bilateral reciprocal exchanges, leading to a decline in social
capital2. By using our diagnostic games to identify cultures where the social ties are either heavily
reciprocity-based or heavily altruism-based, economists may be better able to explain di erences
in the social disruption caused by markets. Additionally, our ﬁnding (described below) that the
reciprocal mechanism only applies to transactions that are e cient suggests a policy use of our
techniques. Development programs like microﬁnance that use social ties to encourage lending and
insurance may be most e ective in communities where the social networks have a strong reciprocity
component, because relationships based on trading e ciency-enhancing favors may help direct re-
sources towards e cient uses. Thus, policymakers could use experiments like ours to identify areas
where intervention may be most e ective.
In our experiments, we distinguish three components of prosocial giving: (1) baseline altruism
toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers,
and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. We begin by directly measuring the
social network of Harvard undergraduates to identify, for each subject, socially close direct friends,
less close friends-of-friends, and socially distant strangers. We then conduct a series of online
games where subjects make unilateral allocation decisions for several types of named partners and
1Economists and sociologists use both frequency of interaction (Marmaros and Sacerdote 2006) and intensity of
altruism interchangeably to measure the strength of social connections (Granovetter 1974, Granovetter 1985, Marsden
and Campbell. 1984, Mitchell 1987, Perlman and Fehr 1987, Mathews, White, Soper, and von Bergen 1998).
2See for example Coleman (1993) on the industrial revolution in Western societies, V¨ olker (1995) on the change
from communism to capitalism in Eastern Germany, and Yellen (1990) on the increased participation of the Kalahari
!Kung in markets.
2one nameless partner (a randomly selected participant from the subject’s dormitory). The games
are either modiﬁed dictator games, as in Andreoni and Miller (2002), or a new “helping game”.
Subjects make multiple decisions but are paid for one decision selected at random. For some
decisions, neither participant is informed which of the decision-maker’s choices was implemented. In
these anonymous decisions, the di erence in allocations between friends and strangers allows us to
quantify the magnitude of directed altruism. In particular, we ﬁnd that subjects send on average 52
percent more money to close friends than to strangers. We also demonstrate that giving to friends
is strongly related to the decision-makers’ underlying baseline altruism toward nameless partners.
For other decisions, both the decision-maker and partner are informed which of the decision-
maker’s choices was selected for payment. We use the di erence between this non-anonymous and
the anonymous treatment to measure the separate e ect of future interaction on prosocial behavior.
We ﬁnd that the nature of the future interaction e ect depends crucially on the social welfare
e ects of prosocial behavior. When giving increases joint surplus then subjects increase giving
to friends (relative to strangers) by an additional 24 percent in the non-anonymous treatment.
Thus, directed altruism is roughly twice as strong as future interaction e ects in determining giving
behavior. When giving decreases joint surplus, then subjects do not give more to friends in the
non-anonymous treatment. In contrast, the directed altruism e ect favors friends over strangers,
both when prosocial behavior is socially e cient and when it is ine cient.
These di erential e ects of future interaction on prosocial behavior are well-explained by the
theory of repeated games. Karlan, Mobius, Szeidl, and Rosenblat (2008) develop a tractable theory
for analyzing repeated games on social networks which we adapt to our setting and call the enforced
reciprocity model. In that model, a decision-maker can safely grant favors (in the form of larger
allocations) to partners when the relationship between them is stronger and more valuable, since
the partner would rather repay the favor than damage the friendship. Granting favors, however, only
beneﬁts both the decision-maker and partner when giving increases social surplus. This conﬂicts with
Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) model, where individuals give in order to signal being an altruistic type.
The signaling model predicts that excess giving to friends should increase for all the games (and all
exchange rates), since giving still distinguishes altruists from selﬁsh types. The enforced reciprocity
model also predicts that giving should increase if the decision-maker and partner share a greater
number of common friends (controlling for social distance). We conﬁrm this prediction in our data.
This provides further evidence for the enforced reciprocity model and distinguishes it from related
theories such as preference-based reciprocity (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). This
result also highlights the inﬂuence of second-order links and network structure on economic decisions.
Lastly, we show that decision-makers who exhibit greater baseline altruism are treated more
generously by their friends. However, we show that friends do not reward intrinsic kindness, but
rather, that kind people tend to have friends who exhibit greater baseline altruism themselves.
Our paper builds on a rich experimental literature on other-regarding preferences and cooper-
ation. Altruistic behavior toward strangers has been observed in a variety of laboratory contexts
3(see Camerer (2003) for an extensive survey). Ho man, McCabe, and Smith (1996) suggests that
a decrease in perceived “social distance” increases donations in dictator games. Our paper reduces
social distance in two ways: (a) we distinguish between giving to friends versus giving to strangers;
and (b) we either reveal or do not reveal which decision is implemented. Our online experimental
design is a signiﬁcant methodological advance because it provides a practical way to match subjects
with their real-world friends.3 Lab experiments that do relax traditional anonymous matching of
strangers typically reveal demographic characteristics such as gender or ethnicity (for example, see
Fershtman and Gneezy (2001)). Very few lab experiments explicitly rely on subjects’ ongoing rela-
tionships with their friends as we do in our non-anonymous treatment. Instead repeated interactions
are incorporated directly into the experimental design, increasing prosocial behavior (see Roth and
Murninghan (1978) and Murninghan and Roth (1983) for early examples). A notable exception
is the seminal work of Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000), who match subjects at
various social distances in a trust game.4 In subsequent research, Goeree, McConnell, Mitchell,
Tromp, and Yariv (2007) have adopted the anonymous treatment of our experimental design (using
a standard dictator game) and also ﬁnd strong evidence for directed altruism in a school network of
teenage girls (also see Bra˜ nas-Garza, Cobo-Reyes, Paz Espinosa, Jim´ enez, and Ponti (2006) for data
from experiments with European university students). To the best of our knowledge, our design is
the ﬁrst to distinguish between directed altruism and future interaction e ects in social networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes several relevant theories:
enforced reciprocity, signaling, and preference-based reciprocity; and reviews their testable implica-
tions. Section 3 presents the experimental design. Section 4 summarizes the main features of the
data. Our empirical results on directed altruism are presented in section 5. Section 6 analyzes de-
cisions under non-anonymity. In section 7, we consider two benchmarks comparing the importance
and magnitude of the directed altruism and future interaction e ects. Section 8 shows that friends
tend to have similar levels of baseline altruism. Section 9 concludes by discussing the implications
of our results for the theoretical and empirical analysis of prosocial behavior.
2 Theoretical Framework
We brieﬂy review the predictions of three di erent theories that explain decision-making when there
is a prospect of future interaction. We refer the interested reader to the earlier NBER working
paper for a detailed formal treatment of each theory (Leider, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Do 2007). We
assume throughout that there is a decision-maker, M and a partner, P, who are embedded in a
social network. We calculate the social distance DMP between the decision-maker and the partner
as the shortest path connecting them: for example, two direct friends have a social distance of 1,
while a friend of a friend is of distance 2 (see Figure 1). The decision-maker’s allocation decisions
3Our experimental design ﬁts the deﬁnition of an artefactual ﬁeld experiment from Harrison and List (2004).
4See also Polzer, Neale, and Glenn (1993) comparing allocations to friends and strangers in an ultimatum game.
4in the anonymous treatment (neither decision-maker nor partner learn about the decision) and the
non-anonymous treatment (both agents learn about the decision) are denoted with xMP and ˜ xMP,
respectively (coded so that a larger x implies greater prosocial behavior).5
We assume, as a starting point, that decision-makers have altruistic preferences whose strength
varies with social distance. We use a simple linear speciﬁcation to capture decision-making in the
anonymous treatment, that is a natural extension of existing preferences-based altruism models:6
xMP =  ZMP +  1DMP +  M +  MP, (1)
We control for observable demographic characteristics of both individuals (ZMP). The coe cient
 M captures the decision-maker’s intrinsic generosity toward all partners (independent of social
distance), which we refer to as her baseline altruism. The coe cient  1 determines how the decision-
maker’s altruism varies with social distance, which we call directed altruism.
2.1 Enforced Reciprocity
Repeated games provide a natural framework to analyze the decision-maker’s allocation, ˜ xMP,
under the prospect of future interactions. However, repeated games typically admit many equilibria
even in a two-person setting – this multiplicity problem is compounded for social networks where
hundreds of agents often interact. Karlan, Mobius, Szeidl, and Rosenblat (2008) provide a tractable
framework for modeling repeated game e ects in social networks. They assume that decision-maker
and partner share a relationship that is “consumed” in the future and gives both of them utility
VMP. A decision-maker who is more prosocial under non-anonymity compared to anonymity, such
that ˜ xMP   xMP > 0, grants a “favor” to the partner and can use the value of the relationship to
the partner as “social collateral” to enforce repayment of the favor. If the partner refuses to return
the favor their relationship breaks down and both agents lose the value of their friendship.
In our working paper, we formally show that in the unique subgame perfect equilibrium the
decision-maker allocates a larger amount under non-anonymity compared to anonymity only when
giving is e cient, and thus increases social surplus. In this case, both the decision-maker and the
partner keep some of the surplus created by the favor. In contrast, when giving is ine cient a favor
that has to be repaid makes both the decision-maker and the partner worse o .
We can also show that the di erence in allocations between the non-anonymous and anonymous
treatments, ˜ xMP   xMP, is increasing in the value of the relationship VMP because the decision-
maker is willing to grant, and the partner is willing to repay, larger favors. This motivates the
following empirical model of allocation decisions under non-anonymity:
˜ xMP =  ZMP +  xMP +  VMP +  M +  MP. (2)
5Therefore, the decision-maker’s utility is decreasing in x and the partner’s utility is increasing in x.
6Andreoni (1990) model altruism as “warm glow”, while Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000),
and Charness and Rabin (2002) focus on preferences over payo  distributions.
5We include the decision-maker’s anonymous decision, xMP, as a covariate, because our enforced
reciprocity model predicts deviations from the anonymous benchmark. The model also predicts
that enforced reciprocity and altruism are substitutes ( < 1): since the decision-maker will give the
largest enforceable favor (when giving is e cient) and the partner will retain some of the surplus,
the decision-maker’s marginal utility from giving an additional altruistic “gift” is smaller compared
to the anonymous case (the partner is now “richer” than in the anonymous case).
We consider two proxies for the value of the relationship, VMP. First, we expect that relationship
value decreases with social distance because a decision-maker is less likely to interact with a socially
distant partner in the future. Second, the enforced reciprocity model of Karlan, Mobius, Szeidl, and
Rosenblat (2008) suggests maximum network ﬂow as an alternative measure. The maximum ﬂow
counts the number of distinct paths between decision-maker and partner (see Figure 1). Network
ﬂow captures structural features of the social network that are not captured by social distance
alone. For example, having more friends in common increases network ﬂow, while social distance
is unchanged. Network ﬂow formalizes a common intuition in the sociology literature that “dense”
networks strengthen trust by facilitating informal arrangements (Coleman 1988, Coleman 1990).
In Karlan, Mobius, Szeidl, and Rosenblat’s (2008) enforced reciprocity model each common friend
increases the “social collateral” between the decision-maker and the partner. The decision-maker is
able to extract repayments for larger favors, since if the partner defaults he will loose his relationship
with all of the common friends as well as the decision-maker. Throughout, we calculate network ﬂow
by only including links that are at most a distance K = 2 away from the decision-maker. Karlan,
Mobius, Szeidl, and Rosenblat (2008) justify this choice of a “circle of trust” of K = 2 by reviewing
some the existing empirical literature in economics and sociology, such as Granovetter (1974).
Table 1 summarizes the main predictions of the enforced reciprocity model (as well as the
signaling and preference based-reciprocity models discussed below).
2.2 Signaling
In recent work, Benabou and Tirole (2006) propose a signaling model that provides an alternative
theory for explaining greater generosity to friends under non-anonymity. In their framework, agents
care about being perceived as an altruistic (rather than greedy) type so they act more generously
when their actions can be observed. Moreover, it is reasonable to extend their model to assume
that individuals care more about signaling generosity to friends than to strangers, because they are
more likely to interact with friends in the future.
A key distinguishing prediction of the signaling model is that decision-makers should increase
their allocation decision under non-anonymity compared to anonymity both when prosocial behavior
is e cient and when it is ine cient. Larger allocations are just as good (if not better) signals
of generosity when giving is ine cient than when giving is e cient. Additionally, excess giving
under non-anonymity is independent of the level of altruism in Benabou and Tirole’s (2006) model
because signaling utility and distributional utility are additively separable. This e ect contrasts to
6the enforced reciprocity model, where altruism and favors are substitutes.
2.3 Preference-Based Reciprocity
A third possible mechanism for future interaction e ects is preference-based reciprocity: Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger (2004) develop a psychological game theory model of sequential reciprocity, where
an individual treats kindly (unkindly) those who have treated/will treat her kindly (unkindly).
As in enforced reciprocity, the decision-maker increases her allocation between non-anonymity and
anonymity only when giving is e cient, anticipating that with some probability, assumed to be
decreasing in social distance, the partner may act to beneﬁt the decision-maker.
Under preference-based reciprocity, however, the partner’s desire to return the decision-maker’s
favor is intrinsic, rather than designed to preserve the relationship with the decision-maker or com-
mon friends. Therefore, unlike the enforced reciprocity model, preference-based reciprocity would
not predict that the network ﬂow measure independently correlates with increased generosity after
having controlled for the frequency of future interaction (via social distance).
3 Experimental Design
Figure 2 presents the major features of our experimental design. In order to recruit more subjects
and map a larger social network, all communication with subjects was conducted by email and all
choices were submitted on a website (rather than in a lab) that subjects could access with a password
through their own web browsers. We conducted two waves of the experiment. In each wave, we ﬁrst
used a novel task to elicit the social network truthfully. We then had subjects play an allocation
game with other subjects in the network. In Wave 1, we used modiﬁed dictator games with varying
exchange rates, and in Wave 2, we used a new helping game. In both waves, decision-makers ﬁrst
decided on allocations between themselves and other unnamed (“nameless”) partners, and then, a
few days later, made several allocations between themselves and named partners (identiﬁed by real
ﬁrst and last name) at various social distances. For both waves, a single decision was randomly
selected for payment and all players were informed of their earnings by email.
We conducted two major information treatments using a within-subject design in Wave 1 and
a between-subject design in Wave 2. In these treatments we varied how much information was
revealed to both parties at the end of the experiment. In the “anonymous” treatment, each subject
was merely informed of their total payo  for the experiment - neither decision-makers nor partners
found out which particular decision was implemented. In the “non-anonymous” treatment, both the
decision-maker and partner were told both their total payo  and which decision was implemented.
73.1 Design for Wave 1: Coordination Task and Dictator Games
Network Elicitation. To measure the social network, we used a coordination task to provide subjects
incentives to truthfully report their friendships. Each subject listed her 10 best friends and the
average amount of time per week she spends with each of them.7 Each time a listed friend also
listed the subject, the subject was paid 50 cents, with probability 0.5 if their answers about time
spent together disagreed, or with probability 0.75 if they agreed. We made the expected payo  (25
or 37.50 cents) large enough to give an incentive to list their friends truthfully, and small enough to
discourage “gaming”. The randomization was included to limit disappointment if a subject was only
named by a few people. To deﬁne the social network, we say that two subjects have a direct link if at
least one of them named the other person. We call this type of social network the “OR-network”.8
Allocation game. After measuring the social network, we randomly assigned each subject the
role of decision-maker or partner in the dictator games.9 Each decision-maker then played modiﬁed
dictator games with a nameless partner randomly selected from the decision-maker’s dormitory.10
She was asked to make allocation decisions for both the anonymous and the non-anonymous con-
ditions. The decision-maker allocated 50 tokens between herself and the recipient. However, the
value of a token to the decision-maker and to the recipient di ered between games. In one case a
token was worth 10 cents to the decision-maker, and 30 cents to the recipient (“1:3”), while in the
second case they were worth 20 cents to the decision-maker and 20 cents to the recipient (“1:1”),
and in a third case they were worth 30 cents to the decision-maker and 10 cents to the recipient
(“3:1”). We can therefore observe allocations when giving is e cient, neutral and ine cient. Each
decision-maker made allocation choices for each of the three token-money exchange rates.
A few days later, decision-makers played in a second round, in which they were matched in
random order with ﬁve di erent named partners listed using their real ﬁrst and last names: (1) a
direct friend (social distance SD = 1), (2) a friend of a friend (SD = 2), (3) a friend of a friend of a
friend (SD = 3), (4) a student in the same staircase/ﬂoor who is at least distance 4 removed from the
student (SD   3), and (5) a randomly selected student from the same dormitory who falls into none
of the above categories. Once again, the decision-maker was asked to make allocation decisions in
both the anonymous and non-anonymous situations. The decision-maker made allocation decisions
under the three di erent exchange rates (3:1, 1:1 and 1:3) for each partner.
To control for experimenter demand e ects of presentation, we randomized whether subjects
ﬁrst made all the nameless decisions or ﬁrst made all the named decisions. For each named part-
ner in Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects ﬁrst submitted their anonymous choice or their
7The choices were 0-30 minutes, 30 minutes to 1 hour, 1-2 hours, 2-4 hours, 4-8 hours or more than 8 hours.
8We ﬁnd similar results using the “AND-network”, where a link exists only if both subjects name each other. The
OR-network has desirable monotonicity properties: a subject with an above average number of actual friends will have
an above average number of friends in the measured network even if the survey truncates his true network. This is not
always true for the AND-network if truncation forces subjects to randomly select from a set of equally close friends.
9In the experimental instructions, we referred to two roles simply as player 1 and player 2.
10The decision-maker is told in the instructions that the recipient was selected from her dormitory.
8non-anonymous choice. We also randomized whether a subject ﬁrst submitted all anonymous (non-
anonymous) choices for all partners on a single screen, or whether a subject submitted both anony-
mous and non-anonymous choices on a separate screen for each partner. Finally, we randomized the
order in which the three di erent exchange rates were listed on subjects’ screens.
Note that each decision-maker made 6 decisions for each partner involving 3 di erent exchange
rates under anonymous and non-anonymous treatments (36 decisions in total). This made it very
di cult for a participant to identify which decision was chosen ex-post from her earnings.11
3.2 Design for Wave 2: Trivia Task and Helping Game
Network Elicitation. To focus on relationships with a high frequency of interaction, we developed
the trivia task technique to elicit the social network for the second wave. Each subject listed 10
friends about whom they would answer questions. Over several weeks, several of the listed friends
were randomly selected and each were sent an e-mail asking him to answer a multiple choice question
about himself (e.g. “What time do you get up in the morning?”). The subject then received an
e-mail directing her to a web page where she had 15 seconds to answer the same question about her
friend. If the subject and her friend submitted identical answers, they both won a prize. The trivia
task provides subjects with incentives to list friends that the subject spends time with frequently
(and thus is more likely to know the friends’ habits).
Allocation game. For the second wave we used a new allocation game to capture the kind
of helping behavior that occurs in natural relationships, where an individual might face di erent
opportunity costs to help a friend who needs a favor. In the helping game, each decision-maker was
endowed with $45, and each partner was endowed with $0. The decision-maker was asked to report
the maximum price that she would be willing to pay in order for the partner to receive a gain of
$30. A random price between $0 and $30 was determined, and if her maximum willingness to pay
was equal or greater than the random price the partner received $30 and the random price was
deducted from the decision-maker’s endowment. Otherwise, the decision-maker’s payo  equalled
her endowment of $45, and the partner’s payo  equaled his endowment of $0.
E ectively, the decision-maker revealed how much she valued a $30 gain for the partner. As in
the ﬁrst design, subjects made two rounds of decisions: ﬁrst they played with a nameless partner,
and then they played with four named partners. Also, we chose a between-subjects design for the
anonymity manipulation: the decisions for the nameless partner were always anonymous, while in
the second round decisions were either all anonymous or all non-anonymous. Every subject played
both roles in the game, of a decision-maker and of a partner, which allowed us to test whether the
11While in principle the dictator could reveal his allocation to the partner after the experiment in the anonymous
case, since the dictator was not told which decision was selected for payment, he would have had to make choices with
unique payo s so that he would know which partner to inform, and remember those choices several weeks later when
payments were made. Post-experiment breaking of anonymity is also less of a concern in the Helping Game (described
in the next section), since the partner could not verify which subject helped him, since all help yields the same payo ;
nor could he verify the helper’s cuto , only that it was higher than the unknown price.
9baseline altruism of the recipient a ects the decision-maker’s choice. To control for experimenter
demand e ects of presentation, we randomized the order of named partners.
4 Data Description
4.1 Dictator Games
In December, 2003, Harvard sophomores, juniors and seniors at two dormitories were recruited
through posters, ﬂyers, and mail invitation. Subjects who logged onto the website were asked to (1)
list their best friends’ names using the coordination task and (2) ﬁll in a basic demographic ques-
tionnaire. Subjects were required to name friends from the two participating dormitories. Subjects
were paid their earnings from the coordination task, plus a ﬂat payment of $10 for completing the
survey. They were also eligible to earn cash prizes in a ra e, adding $3 (on average) in earnings.
Experimental earnings were added to the student’s electronic cash-card.12
569 of the 806 students in those two dormitories (71 percent) participated in the social network
survey. The survey generated 5690 one-way links. Of those, 2086 links were symmetric links
where both subjects named each other.13 The resulting OR-network consists of a single connected
component with 802 subjects, forming a comprehensive map of the social network.
The dictator game stage was conducted over a one-week period in May 2004. Half of all subjects
who participated in the coordination stage were randomly selected to be decision-makers. Out of
284 eligible decision-makers invited, 193 participated in round 1 (decisions for nameless partners)
and 181 of those participated in round 2 (decisions for named partners). The participants were
representative of the coordination stage sample composition.
4.2 The Helping Game
Information on social networks was collected in December 2004 through an online trivia task adver-
tised on the popular student social website facebook.com.14 2,360 students signed up, generating
were 12,782 links between participants out of 23,600 total links15 with 6,880 symmetric links. In
total, 5,576 out of the 6,389 undergraduates at Harvard either participated in the trivia task or
were named by a participant. Upperclassmen had higher participation rates, with only 34 percent
of freshman responding, but with 45, 52, and 53 percent of sophomores, juniors, and seniors par-
ticipating, respectively. The social “OR”-network of 5,576 individuals contains a single component
(meaning all individuals are connected) with a mean path length of 4.2 between participants.
The helping game stage was conducted in May 200616, over a one-week period with all juniors and
12These cards are widely used on campus as a cash substitute, and many o -campus merchants accept the cards.
13For symmetric links, the two subjects’ assessment of the amount of time spent together in a typical week did not
di er more than 1 category out of 5 in 80 percent of all cases.
14More than 90 percent of Harvard undergraduates were already members of facebook.com at that time.
15Subjects could also list non-participants in our experiment as friends.
16During both waves of the experiment, the network information was also used for other experiments.
10seniors who had participated in the previous academic year’s trivia task. 776 subjects participated
in the ﬁrst part of the helping game (decisions for nameless partners), and 695 subjects completed
the second part (decisions for named partners).
4.3 Summary Statistics
Table 2 shows the mean actions of decision-makers for the dictator and helping games, for both
the anonymous and non-anonymous treatments. Two patterns are clear: in all games and in both
treatments, the decision-makers’ generosity toward their partners decreased with social distance,
and for any game and at any social distance, the decision-makers’ generosity is always higher under
non-anonymity than under anonymity. Di erences between treatments are signiﬁcant across all
social distances in the dictator game, and for social distance 1 and 2 in the helping game. For both
games and both treatments, decision-makers’ allocation choices are signiﬁcantly larger for partners
who are direct friends than for partners at any other social distance.
In the dictator game with the 1:3 (e cient) exchange rate, the decision-maker passes an average
of 19.19 tokens to a direct friend versus 12.20 tokens to a partner at social distance 4. With an
(ine cient) exchange rate of 3:1, the decision-maker passes only 8.03 versus 6.15 tokens, respectively.
In the non-anonymous treatment, for all social distances, the decision-maker passes about 4 to 5
more tokens when altruism is e cient and about 2 to 4 more tokens when altruism is ine cient.
In the helping game’s anonymous treatment, the average willingness to pay is $12.77 for a direct
friend, and decreases to $7.09 for a partner at social distance 4. Non-anonymity increases the cuto 
by approximately $2 across social distances.
Curiously, in the anonymous treatment for all the dictator games and in the helping game,
nameless partners are treated more generously than are friends of friends, despite the fact that
the expected social distance of a randomly chosen partner is at least 3. In the non-anonymous
treatment, on the other hand, the contributions to nameless partners closely track contributions to
named partners at distance 3. The average level of giving to nameless partners in our dictator games
is similar to the results reported in Andreoni and Miller (2002). Nameless partners are given 34.8%,
23.2% and 16.6% of the token endowment in the 1:3, 1:1, and 3:1 exchange rates, respectively, in
our experiments, while nameless partners were given 32%, 24.3% and 20% of the token endowment
in the equivalent treatments of Andreoni and Miller (2002).
We can interpret nameless decisions under anonymity as the decision-makers’ baseline or un-
conditional generosity, since she has no information about the partner. Our data replicates the
well-known ﬁnding of Andreoni and Miller (2002) and of Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007) that
individuals are highly heterogenous in their unconditional altruism. In particular, we ﬁnd that many
subjects are perfectly selﬁsh: in the three dictator games, 28, 46, and 64 percent of subjects pass
zero tokens, while in the helping game, 20 percent set a cuto  of zero dollars.
115 Anonymity and Directed Altruism
In this section, we use the anonymous treatments to analyze how decision-makers’ altruistic prefer-
ences vary with social distance. In section 2, we motivated the following speciﬁcation for estimating
the strength of directed altruism:
xMP =  Z +  1DMP +  M +  MP. (1)
Recall that xMP is the decision-maker’s action in the anonymous treatment. Since agents’ actions
are bounded below by zero and above by 50 in the dictator games, and by zero and 30 in the helping
game, we use Tobit regressions to estimate equation (1). We exploit the fact that we observe
multiple actions for each decision-maker in the anonymous treatment, and control for unobserved
heterogeneity in the decision-maker’s baseline altruistic type  M by including random e ects.17 We
control for the social distance, DMP, between the decision-maker and the partner by including
dummy variables SD1 (meaning a direct friend at social distance SD = 1) to SD5 (meaning social
distance SD = 5). The omitted categories are SD4 for the dictator games and SD5 for the helping
game.18 The estimated coe cient on SD1 in a dictator game, for example, should be interpreted as
the number of extra tokens that the decision-maker passes to a direct friend compared to a distant
partner in the anonymous treatment, while the estimated coe cient on SD2 captures directed
altruism toward a friend of friend. The estimates of the Tobit regression for all of the dictator
games and for the helping game are reported in the odd-numbered columns of table 4.
We also estimate the speciﬁcation with additional covariates, and report the results in the even-
numbered columns of table 4. We include the decision-maker’s action toward a nameless player in
the anonymous treatment as a proxy for the decision-maker’s baseline altruistic type  M. In the
helping game, we can also control for the partner’s baseline altruistic type by including the partner’s
nameless decision (since all subjects played both roles in the helping game). Furthermore, we added
dummy variables for both players’ gender, their class (sophomores, juniors, or seniors), and whether
they share a staircase (dictator game) or a they share a dormitory (helping game).19
Result 1 Baseline altruism and directed altruism are correlated. Subjects who give more to name-
less partners also give more to speciﬁc named partners.
The two variables that consistently and strongly predict how generously a decision-maker treats a
partner in her social network are the social distance from the partner and the generosity displayed
toward a nameless partner. Looking across all regression speciﬁcations, for both the dictator games
and the helping game, each one unit increase in generosity toward a nameless partner is associated
with a 0.56 to 1.40 unit increase in generosity toward a named player. Since the nameless decision
17Our results are very similar when we estimate equation 1 using standard random e ects or ﬁxed e ects GLS.
18The social network that we used for the second experiment is much larger because it potentially involves all
Harvard undergraduates. Therefore, the maximum social distance between subjects is higher.
19Since the participation rate was lower for the helping game, the ”same entryway” dummy variable is less useful.
12and the named decisions were elicited one week apart, this continuity indicates a substantial degree
of stability in the decision-makers’ preferences over time. Because the e ect of “nameless altruism”
on “named altruism” is fairly close to 1, we view the nameless decision of a decision-maker as a
useful proxy measure of her baseline altruism, a heterogeneous trait that strongly inﬂuences the
decision-maker’s action toward speciﬁc named partners.
Result 2 Close social ties induce directed altruism. Allocations to friends are substantially higher
than allocations to distant partners/strangers.
Moreover, social distance also matters greatly: decision-makers are substantially more generous to
direct friends than to partners located at greater social distance. Generosity decreases quickly and
monotonically with social distance, although the estimated coe cients on SD2 and SD3 are not
signiﬁcantly di erent from each other for all games. Given the three exchange rates in the dictator
games, the distance coe cients are of similar absolute magnitude, which implies that decision-makers
are making a greater relative sacriﬁce in the case of ine cient altruism.
Interestingly, neither the subjects’ gender, nor their geographic proximity, have a signiﬁcant
e ect on generosity. However, the signs of the estimated gender coe cients for the decision-maker
are consistent with Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), who found that men are more likely to exhibit
social-surplus maximizing preferences: they are more generous in dictator games when giving is
e cient and less generous when giving is ine cient. College juniors are somewhat more selﬁsh than
are sophomores and seniors; however, most of the coe cients on the class dummies are insigniﬁcant.
6 Non-anonymity and Future Interaction E ects
We now examine how a decision-maker’s allocation changes under non-anonymity (i.e. both the
decision-maker and partner are told which choice was selected for payment) and discuss which
model – enforced reciprocity, signaling or preference-based reciprocity – best ﬁts our results.
6.1 Graphical Analysis
In ﬁgure 3 we analyze the change in allocations (for the same named partner) between the non-
anonymous treatment and the anonymous treatment. Since our helping game was a between-subject
design, we can only perform this exercise for dictator decisions. We divide decision-makers into ﬁve
groups depending on their generosity in the anonymous treatment (0 to 9, 10 to 19, etc.), where
the most selﬁsh subjects passed between 0 and 9 tokens. We then plot the average number of extra
tokens passed in the non-anonymous treatment versus the anonymous treatment, ˜ xMP   xMP, by
group and by social distance (a proxy for relationship value VMP).20
20In the NBER working paper we use network ﬂow as an alternative proxy with qualitatively identical results.
13Decision-makers substantially increase their action from the anonymous treatment to the non-
anonymous treatment, except the most generous under anonymity.21 This e ect is strongest, up to
ten extra tokens, when the decision-maker is selﬁsh and when giving is e cient. The e ect is half
as large when giving is ine cient, where decision-makers pass at most 5 extra tokens.
The main insight from this graph is that the non-anonymity e ect is large for close friends and
declines with social distance when giving is e cient (and is also somewhat present when giving is
neutral). However, when giving is ine cient, the decision-makers’ additional contributions are quite
small, and do not decrease with social distance for four out of the ﬁve groups. This result provides
some preliminary evidence in support of the enforced reciprocity and preference-based reciprocity
mechanisms and against the signaling mechanism.
The graph also suggest that directed altruism and the non-anonymity e ect are substitutes:
controlling for the strength of a relationship (by ﬁxing either social distance or maximum network
ﬂow), we ﬁnd that the non-anonymity e ect decreases monotonically in most cases, as decision-
makers become more generous in the anonymous treatment.
6.2 Tobit Regressions
In section 2.1, we motivated the following speciﬁcation for the non-anonymous condition:
˜ xMP =  Z +  xMP +  VMP +  M +  MP. (2)
where ˜ xMP is the decision-maker’s action in the non-anonymous treatment when matched with a
speciﬁc named partner P. We again use panel Tobit regressions to account for censoring, and to
control for unobserved heterogeneity in the decision-maker’s response to the non-anonymous treat-
ment. We proxy for the strength of the decision-maker’s relationship with the partner, VMP, by
including either social distance dummies or the maximum network ﬂow measure.22 The omitted so-
cial distance is SD4 for the dictator games and SD5 for the helping game. The estimated coe cient
on SD1 in a dictator game, for example, should be interpreted as the number of extra tokens that
the decision-maker passes to a direct friend under non-anonymity compared to the number of extra
tokens that she passes to a stranger under non-anonymity. All of our regressions control for the
academic class of the decision-maker and partner, because we expect the non-anonymity e ect to be
smaller for juniors and (especially) seniors, since the participants are less likely than sophomores to
interact with each other in the future. On the right-hand side we also include the decision-maker’s
action toward a nameless partner in the non-anonymous treatment as a proxy for the random e ect
 M that captures heterogeneity in how decision-makers respond to non-anonymity.
Importantly, we control for the decision-maker’s intrinsic altruism toward the same partner P
by including her decision in the anonymous treatment, xMP, on the right-hand side of all of our
21Even in this case, the majority of decision-makers do not decrease their action – the negative averages result from
a few decision-makers decreasing their contributions substantially in the non-anonymous treatment.
22In one speciﬁcation, we include both measures in the same regression.
14regressions. This inclusion poses a problem for the helping game given its between-subject design
because for no decision-maker/partner pair in the non-anonymous treatment, do we observe the
decision-maker’s choice for that partner in the anonymous treatment. Therefore, we estimate it
by running an auxiliary random-e ects Tobit regression with data from the anonymous treatment,
and include social distance dummies, and the same set of covariates Z (nameless decision, class
dummies) as in our empirical speciﬁcation of the non-anonymity mechanism.
For each of the three dictator games and for the helping game, we estimate three variants of our
empirical model. We ﬁrst use only social distance to proxy for the strength of a decision-maker’s
relationship to the partner, then use only maximum network ﬂow, and ﬁnally use both measures in
the same regression. All results are reported in table 5.
Result 3 The observability of decisions by partners increases giving more for friends than for
strangers. The di erential e ect is only induced when giving is e cient; therefore, the prospect
of future interactions increases the surplus created.
Our main ﬁnding is that, controlling for a decision-maker’s anonymous action, her response to
non-anonymity increases with the strength of her relationship to the partner, but only if giving is
e cient (i.e. surplus-increasing). This is true regardless of whether we proxy for the strength of
a relationship using social distance or maximum network ﬂow. Note that this result is consistent
with both the enforced reciprocity and the preference-based reciprocity mechanisms, but not with
the signaling mechanism (which predicts excess generosity toward friends for all exchange rates).
The magnitude of the non-anonymity e ect is large, particularly in the dictator game with
exchange rate 1:3. In this game, a decision-maker increases her action by 4.18 tokens when her
partner is a direct friend as opposed to a socially distant partner (statistically signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level). The social closeness e ect is smaller, but still signiﬁcantly di erent from zero, at the
5 percent level for friends of friends (SD2) in the e cient dictator game.23
Our results also provide some evidence for enforced, rather than preference-based, reciprocity.
Result 4 The non-anonymity e ect increases with maximum network ﬂow.
In table 5 we estimate a speciﬁcation for each game including both social distance dummies and
maximum network ﬂow as covariates. For both the e cient dictator game and the helping game, we
ﬁnd that the coe cients on the social distance dummies decrease and become insigniﬁcant when we
add network ﬂow, while the coe cient on ﬂow remains signiﬁcant for the helping game. Additionally,
for the helping game, a likelihood ratio test rejects the speciﬁcation excluding network ﬂow in favor
of the speciﬁcation with both social distance and network ﬂow (p<0.01).24
We also estimate a speciﬁcation for the dictator game using network ﬂow for allocations to direct
friends, presented in table 3, to further demonstrate that network ﬂow is capturing information
23In contrast, when we tested for directed altruism, we did not ﬁnd such a strong e ect for friends of friends.
24For all three dictator games and the helping game, we cannot reject the speciﬁcation with only network ﬂow in
favor of the speciﬁcation with both network ﬂow and social distance (p>0.40 for all speciﬁcations).
15about allocations not included in social distance (since here all partners have a social distance of
one). Moreover, for direct friends we can include a control for the amount of time that the decision-
maker spends with the partner, since this would be an aspect of the relationship possibly omitted
by social distance that would still be consistent with the preference-based model of reciprocity.25
We ﬁnd that when giving is e cient, greater network ﬂow increases the decision-maker’s generosity
toward a direct friend under non-anonymity, even when we control for time spent together. Thus,
network ﬂow predicts generous allocations beyond the social distance information. Moreover, the
estimated coe cient on time spent together is consistently insigniﬁcant and negative. We interpret
these ﬁndings as evidence for the enforced reciprocity model.
Result 5 The non-anonymity e ect and directed altruism are substitutes. Altruistic individuals
have a smaller change in allocations under non-anonymity than selﬁsh individuals.
We also ﬁnd that the estimated coe cients on the decision-maker’s anonymous action, xMP, are
always less than one, which implies that directed altruism and the decision-maker’s response to
non-anonymity are indeed substitutes. The total di erence between the non-anonymous allocation
and the anonymous allocation will be smaller for a more altruistic subject than for a selﬁsh subject.
This conclusion is also consistent with the enforced reciprocity model.
7 Comparing Altruism to Enforced Reciprocity
Having established that both directed altruism and enforced reciprocity play a substantial role in
determining allocation decisions when subjects are connected through a social network, we now
attempt to benchmark the relative importance of each e ect, compared to baseline altruism, for
each condition we study. In table 6, we divide the estimated coe cients on social distance dummies
(SD1 to SD3) from both the anonymous (i.e., measuring directed altruism) and the non-anonymous
(i.e., measuring enforced reciprocity) allocations by the average generosity toward nameless partners
in the anonymous treatment. In other words, we calculate what percent of the baseline altruism
e ect (relative to selﬁshness) the network e ects represent. For the non-anonymous case, we also
include the estimated e ect of a one standard deviation increase in network ﬂow. Directed altruism
toward friends is equal to 52 percent of the average nameless generosity shown in the e cient dictator
game, and is equal to 88 percent for the helping game. When altruism is ine cient, the directed
altruism e ect almost equals average nameless generosity (a 95 percent increase) - nearly double
the magnitude of the e cient case (although, recall that the absolute increase in tokens is slightly
smaller). Social distance, therefore, is as important a determinant of a subject’s generosity as her
baseline altruism, particularly when giving is ine cient.
25However, the measure of time spent together is uncorrelated with our network ﬂow measure for direct friends
(  =0 .03). Thus, any predictive power of network ﬂow appears not to relate to the frequency of interaction.
16In the non-anonymous treatment, friends receive an extra transfer of surplus, equal to almost
24 percent of average nameless generosity for the e cient dictator game and about 35 percent of
nameless generosity for the helping game. Friends of friends receive an extra transfer of about
18 percent of nameless generosity in the e cient dictator game. We ﬁnd a similar pattern but
with slightly smaller magnitudes, for the neutral dictator game. Taken all together, the e ect of
non-anonymity is about half as large as the directed altruism e ect.
Additionally, the non-anonymity e ect is generally weaker for decision-makers who are juniors
and seniors: the signs on the junior and senior dummies are consistently negative, although they are
not always statistically signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with our model of enforced reciprocity,
since the length of the future relationship (and, thus, its value) is potentially shorter (lower) for
upperclassmen, because they will live in the same dorm for a shorter time.
We also consider a di erent benchmark for the magnitude of directed altruism and enforced
reciprocity: how large an increase in baseline altruism (i.e., how many standard deviations) would it
take to equal the e ect of social connections?26 Therefore, in table 6, we also report the estimated
coe cients on SD1, SD2, SD3 and network ﬂow as percentages of the standard deviation of the
distribution of nameless decisions. We ﬁnd that greater social proximity to the partner in the
anonymous dictator games moves the decision-maker’s generosity by at least 0.39 of a standard
deviation, and by a maximum of 1.93 standard deviations in the anonymous helping game. Similarly,
the e ect of enforced reciprocity by this comparison represents an additional increase in generosity
almost half as large as the altruism e ect for the e cient dictator game and the helping game (a
change of 0.14 and 0.69 of a standard deviation, respectively).
8 Correlation in Altruistic Preferences
Our design allows us to analyze whether subjects who are more altruistic also have friends who are
more altruistic. We separate decision-makers into (approximate) quintiles based on their choices for
nameless partners. Tables 7 and 8 present the resulting distributions of friends’ generosity.
Result 6 Friends sort by baseline altruism. Subjects with a high level of baseline altruism have
more friends with a high level of baseline altruism, while selﬁsh subjects have more selﬁsh friends.
First, we ﬁnd that altruistic and selﬁsh subjects have the same number of friends. However, a
subject’s baseline altruism is correlated with the baseline altruism of her friends (chi-square test:
DG p<0.001, HG p<0.01). That is, selﬁsh subjects have a greater number of selﬁsh friends, and
fewer altruistic friends, while altruists have fewer selﬁsh friends and a greater number of altruistic
friends. In particular, the most altruistic quintile in the helping game has 25 percent more highly-
altruistic friends than any other group; in the dictator game, the two most altruistic groups had over
20 percent more highly-altruistic friends than any other group. Moreover, a subject’s friends’ mean
26This measure is used in Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits (2007).
17nameless allocation choice increases with the subject’s baseline altruism. The most altruistic subjects
have friends that are 25 percent more altruistic than the most selﬁsh subjects in the dictator game,
and 14 percent more altruistic in the helping game. Using t-tests, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th quintiles are
signiﬁcantly di erent from the 1st in the helping game, and the 4th and 5th are di erent from the
1st in the dictator game. A non-parametric equality-of-medians test rejects that the ﬁve quintiles
are drawn from distributions with the same median (DG p =0 .039, HG p<0.026). It seems that
subjects either prefer to become friends with people who have similar social preferences, or their
social preferences becomes more similar to each other after they initiate a friendship.
An important consequence of the correlation in friends’ baseline altruism is that it pays to
be generous. For the anonymous treatment of the helping game, table 9 (column 1) displays the
results of regressing the average allocation to partners from decisions made by direct friends on the
partners’ baseline altruism (by quintile): partners with higher baseline altruism have substantially
higher earnings. For example, direct friends of the most altruistic partners set the cuto  more than
5 dollars higher than the direct friends of the most selﬁsh partners. Interestingly, this e ect is
entirely due to kinder partners having nicer friends, and is not due to generally kind partners being
treated more nicely by their friends: we have already shown in our directed altruism regressions in
table 4 that decision-makers do not treat generous partners better. Indeed, when we also control
for the average baseline altruism of the decision-makers in table 9 (column 2), the partner’s baseline
altruism no longer predicts her earnings from friends’ decisions.
9 Conclusion
We use large ﬁeld experiments in real-world social networks to jointly measure two explanations of
prosocial behavior: the prospect of future interaction and directed altruism. We ﬁnd support for
both mechanisms, although the future interaction e ect is half as strong as the directed altruism
e ect. The mechanisms also have di erent welfare e ects: directed altruism promotes equitable
allocations, while enforced reciprocity promotes e cient allocations.
Our results suggest that it is di cult to empirically measure the importance of norms of reci-
procity (based on dynamic game e ects) without ﬁrst measuring underlying directed altruism. For
example, in empirical studies of informal lending and risk-sharing, it may be as important to mea-
sure directed altruism across social ties (using diagnostic games) as it is to observe cash and in-kind
transfers. While both directed altruism and enforced reciprocity suggest that capital in small com-
munities will more likely be directed toward close friends and relatives, the relative importance of
altruism over reciprocity may suggest that resources are not being allocated e ciently to the most
proﬁtable projects. A better understanding of the strength and reach of altruistic ties within and
across families can help policy makers target outside transfers more e ectively.27
27Angelucci, Giorgi, Rangel, and Rasul (2008) show that random positive income shocks from the Progresa natural
experiment are shared within rather than across extended families (consistent with a model of directed altruism).
18Our result that friends cluster by baseline altruism raises another interesting question for future
research: do our friends shape our social preferences (treatment e ect), or do we seek out friends with
similar social preferences (selection e ect)? This could help explain to what extent the distribution of
preferences, as observed in the lab by Andreoni and Miller (2002) and Fisman, Kariv, and Markovits
(2007), is endogenous. In Leider, Mobius, Rosenblat, and Do (2008), we provide preliminary evidence
against selection based on altruistic type. When we elicit beliefs of partners about the generosity of
their friends toward them and toward anonymous others, we ﬁnd that partners expect to be treated
better by their friends, but subjects do not incorporate their friends’ speciﬁc baseline altruism into
their beliefs. Therefore, it appears that while friends tend to cluster by their altruistic type, their
beliefs about decision-makers’ generosity are mostly driven by expectations of directed altruism.
Future research can utilize carefully designed ﬁeld experiments to measure the relative strength of
selection versus social interaction in the formation and evolution of social preferences.
References
Andreoni, J. (1990): “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow
Giving,” Economic Journal, 100(401), 464–477.
Andreoni, J., and J. Miller (2002): “Giving According to GARP: An Experiment on the
Consistency of Preferences for Altruism,” Econometrica, 70, 737–753.
Andreoni, J., and L. Vesterlund (2001): “Which is the Fair Sex? Gender Di erences in
Altruism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 293–312.
Angelucci, M., G. D. Giorgi, M. Rangel, and I. Rasul (2008): “Insurance in the Extended
Family,” Working paper, University of Arizona.
Benabou, R., and J. Tirole (2006): “Incentives and Prosocial Behavior,” American Economic
Review, 96, 1652–1678.
Bolton, G., and A. Ockenfels (2000): “ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competi-
tion,” American Economic Review, 90(1), 166–193.
Bra˜ nas-Garza, P., R. Cobo-Reyes, M. Paz Espinosa, N. Jim´ enez, and G. Ponti (2006):
“Altruism in the (Social) Network,” DFAEII working paper, University of the Basque Country -
Department of Foundations of Economic Analysis II.
Camerer, C. (2003): Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press.
Charness, G., and M. Rabin (2002): “Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(3), 817–869.
Coleman, J. S. (1988): “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital,” American Journal of
Sociology, 94, 95–120.
(1990): Foundations of Social Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
19(1993): “The Rational Reconstruction of Society,” American Sociological Review, 58, 1–15.
Dufwenberg, M., and G. Kirchsteiger (2004): “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,” Games
and Economic Behavior, 47(2), 268–298.
Fehr, E., and K. Schmidt (1999): “A Theory of Fairness, Competition and Cooperation,” Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868.
Fershtman, C., and U. Gneezy (2001): “Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An Experi-
mental Approach,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 351–377.
Fisman, R., S. Kariv, and D. Markovits (2007): “Individual Preferences for Giving,” forth-
coming in the American Economic Review.
Glaeser, E. L., D. I. Laibson, J. A. Scheinkman, and C. L. Soutter (2000): “Measuring
Trust,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115.
Goeree, J. K., M. A. McConnell, T. Mitchell, T. Tromp, and L. Yariv (2007): “Linking
and Giving Among Teenage Girls,” mimeo, California Institute of Technology.
Granovetter, M. (1974): Getting a Job. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
(1985): “Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness,” Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology, 83, 481–510.
Harrison, G. W., and J. A. List (2004): “Field Experiments,” Journal of Economic Literature,
42(4), 1013–1059.
Hoffman, E., K. McCabe, and V. L. Smith (1996): “Social Distance and Other-Regarding
Behavior in Dictator Games,” American Economic Review, 86(3), 653–60.
Karlan, D., M. Mobius, A. Szeidl, and T. Rosenblat (2008): “Trust and Social Collateral,”
Working paper, Harvard University.
Leider, S., M. M. Mobius, T. Rosenblat, and Q.-A. Do (2008): “What Do We Expect from
Friends?,” .
Leider, S., M. M. Mobius, T. S. Rosenblat, and Q.-A. Do (2007): “Directed Altruism and
Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks,” working paper 13135, NBER.
Marmaros, D., and B. Sacerdote (2006): “How Do Friendships Form?,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 121(1), 79–119.
Marsden, P. V., and K. E. Campbell. (1984): “Measuring tie-strength,” Social Forces, 63,
482–501.
Mathews, K. M., M. C. White, B. Soper, and C. W. von Bergen (1998): “Association of
indicators and predictors of tie-strength,” Psychological Reports, 83, 1459–1469.
Mitchell, J. C. (1987): “The components of strong ties among homeless women,” Social Networks,
9, 37–47.
Murninghan, J. K., and A. E. Roth (1983): “Expecting Continued Play in Prisoner’s Dilemma
Games,” Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 27(2), 279–300.
20Perlman, D., and B. Fehr (1987): “The development of intimate relationship,” in Intimate
relationships, ed. by D. Perlman, and S. Duck. Sage, Newbury Park, CA.
Polzer, J. T., M. A. Neale, and P. O. Glenn (1993): “The E ects of Relationships and
Justiﬁcation in an Interdependent Allocation Task,” Group Decision and Negotiation, 2(2), 135–
148.
Rabin, M. (1993): “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,” American Economic
Review, 83(5), 1281–1302.
Roth, A. E., and J. K. Murninghan (1978): “Equilibrium Behavior and Repeated Play of the
Prisoners Dilemma,” Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 17, 189–198.
Townsend, R. (1994): “Risk and Insurance in Village India,” Econometrica, 62, 539–591.
Udry, C. (1994): “Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market: An Empirical Investigation in
Northern Nigeria,” Review of Economic Studies, 61(3), 495–526.
V¨ olker, B. (1995): “Should auld Acquaintance be forgot...?” Institutions of Communism, the
Transition to Capitalism and Personal Networks: the Case of East Germany. Thela Thesis.,
Amsterdam.
Yellen, J. E. (1990): “The Transformation of the Kalahari !Kung,” Scientiﬁc American, pp.
96–105.
YouGov (2007): “What’s Money Between Friends?,” PayPal UK Media Center.
Figure 1: Examples to illustrate di erence between maximum network ﬂow and social distance
SD=1 Flow=1
MP
SD=2 Flow=1
MP
SD=1 Flow=3
MP
SD=2 Flow=3
MP
All links are assumed to have unit capacity. The examples illustrate the di erent features of the social network that are
captured by social distance and maximum network ﬂow, respectively: the addition of common friends will necessarily
increase ﬂow but can leave social distance unchanged.
21Table 1: Testable predictions about decision-makers’ allocation decisions under non-anonymity ver-
sus anonymity
Enforced Signaling Preference-based
Reciprocity Reciprocity
Greater generosity towards friends
( > 0) when giving is e cient Yes Yes Yes
Greater generosity towards friends
( > 0) when giving is ine cient No Yes No
Altruistic decision-makers are rela-
tively less generous towards friends
compared to strangers
Yes No Yes
Maximum network ﬂow is a separate
predictor of generosity beyond social
distance.
Yes No No
We estimate the empirical model ˜ xMP =  Z+ xMP+ VMP+ M+ MP where ˜ xMP and xMP are the decision-maker’s
actions under non-anonymity and anonymity, respectively, and VMP describes the value of the relationship between
decision-maker and partner (proxied by social distance).
Figure 2: Overview of experimental design (Waves 1 and 2)
 
and and
or
Wave 1: 
Within- 
subject 
design 
Network Elicitation  Allocation Game 
Coordination Task 
Wave 2: 
Between- 
subject 
design 
Trivia Task  Helping Game (Anon)  
Nameless Partner 
Helping Game (Anon)  
Named Partner 
Helping Game (Non-Anon) 
Named Partner 
Dictator Games (Non-Anon) 
Nameless Partner 
Dictator Games (Anon) 
Nameless Partner 
Dictator Games (Non-Anon) 
Named Partner 
Dictator Games (Anon) 
Named Partner 
In Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects ﬁrst made all the nameless decisions or whether they ﬁrst made all
the named decisions. For each named partner in Wave 1, we randomized whether subjects ﬁrst submitted their
anonymous choice for that partner or their non-anonymous choice. We also randomized whether a subject ﬁrst
submitted all anonymous (non-anonymous) choices for all partners on a single screen, or whether a subject submitted
both anonymous and non-anonymous choices on a separate screen for each partner. Finally, we randomized the order
in which the three di erent exchange rates were listed on subjects’ screens.
22Table 2: Summary statistics for decision-makers’ actions in dictator and helping games
Anonymous Treatment
SD=1 SD=2 SD=3 SD=4 SD=5 Nameless
Dictator Game (N=206) (N=286) (N=312) (N=97) (N=4) (N=193)
Ex. Rate 1:3 19.19 16.80 15.14 12.20 12.50 17.42
( 19.64) ( 19.30) ( 18.79) ( 15.47) ( 25.00) ( 18.21)
Ex. Rate 1:1 11.96 10.79 9.39 8.79 6.25 11.61
( 13.53) ( 12.68) ( 11.89) ( 10.25) ( 12.50) ( 12.83)
Ex. Rate 3:1 8.03 7.28 5.66 6.15 0.00 8.31
( 13.55) ( 12.88) ( 11.10) ( 10.72) ( 0.00) ( 13.23)
Helping Game (N=876) (N=149) (N=73) (N=181) (N=78) (N=776)
12.77 8.97 7.14 7.68 7.09 9.52
( 8.14) ( 7.11) ( 6.80) ( 7.16) ( 6.95) ( 7.24)
Non-anonymous Treatment
SD=1 SD=2 SD=3 SD=4 SD=5 Nameless
Dictator Game (N=206) (N=288) (N=313) (N=99) (N=4) (N=193)
Ex. Rate 1:3 24.32 21.67 19.79 14.80 37.50 19.87
( 18.91) ( 18.75) ( 18.54) ( 15.72) ( 25.00) ( 18.21)
Ex. Rate 1:1 16.33 14.62 13.99 12.16 18.75 13.98
( 12.90) ( 12.34) ( 12.45) ( 10.68) ( 12.50) ( 12.82)
Ex. Rate 3:1 10.52 9.88 9.18 10.15 0.00 9.62
( 13.56) ( 13.17) ( 13.18) ( 12.77) ( 0.00) ( 13.80)
Helping Game (N=625) (N=96) (N=42) (N=132) (N=62)
14.54 11.28 9.26 8.83 8.11
( 8.13) ( 7.25) ( 7.04) ( 7.28) ( 6.69)
Table shows averages of number of passed tokens (dictator games) and average cuto s (helping game) by social distance
(OR-network). Standard deviations are in parentheses. Nameless refers to matches between the decision-maker and
the partner where the identity of the partner is not known to the decision-maker.
Table 3: E ects of “average time spent per week” and network ﬂow on decision-makers’ generosity
towards direct friends under non-anonymity (dictator game only)
Dictator-1:3 Dictator-1:1 Dictator-3:1
(1) (2) (3)
Anonymous Pass 0.25 0.238 0.474
(0.063)   (0.211) (0.115)  
Network Flow 0.676 -.024 0.155
(0.306)  (0.395) (0.262)
Average Time Spent per Week -.328 -.089 -.060
(0.368) (0.488) (0.323)
Const. 12.131 13.946 4.998
(3.640)   (5.493)  (3.286)
Obs. 206 206 206
Signiﬁcance levels: † : 10%   : 5%    : 1%
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is the number of tokens passed by the decision-
maker to a direct friend in the non-anonymous dictator games. All speciﬁcations are estimated as Tobit regressions
with decision-maker random e ects. “Anonymous Action” denotes the decision-maker’s action for the speciﬁc partner
in the anonymous treatment. Network ﬂow is calculated for a circle of trust K = 2. Average time spent per week is a
categorical variable which takes the values 0 (less than half an hour per week), 1 (30 min to 1 hour), 2 (1 hour to 2
hours), 3 (2 hours to 4 hours), 4 (4 hours to 8 hours) and 5 (more than 8 hours a week).
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24Figure 3: Di erence between number of passed tokens in the non-anonymous and anonymous treat-
ments in the dictator game by social distance
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26Table 6: Relative magnitudes of directed altruism and non-anonymity e ects as percentages of all
the decision-makers’ average nameless action and as percentages of a standard deviation in nameless
actions
Directed Altruism E ect of Non-Anonymity
Relative to: SD1 SD2 SD3 SD1 SD2 SD3 Network Flow
Dictator Game (1:3)
Average 52 8 -8 24 18 3 19
Standard dev. 39 8 -4 14 10 2 11
Dictator Game (1:1)
Average 52 16 3 21 12 9 10
Standard dev. 41 14 5 24 14 10 11
Dictator Game (3:1)
Average 95 49 43 -7 8 -3 -6
Standard dev. 48 25 23 -4 4 -1 -3
Helping Game
Average 88 36 12 35 13 19 30
Standard dev. 192 82 28 69 25 38 59
An “Average” row is calculated by dividing estimates for directed altruism (table 4) and the e ect of non-anonymity
(table 5) by the average nameless decision in the anonymous treatment (table 2, “Nameless” column). A “Standard
deviation” row is determined by calculating the increase in nameless decision (measured in standard deviations) that
would have an equal predicted increase in choice as the estimates for directed altruism and non-anonymity. For the
“Network Flow” column we report the estimated e ect of a one-standard deviation increase in network ﬂow (equal to
10 units of network ﬂow for “circle of trust” K = 2).
Table 7: Correlation in baseline altruism among direct friends (dictator game (1:3))
Nameless Percent of Average # of Distribution of Friends’ Types (percent) Avg. Nameless DG
DG Choice Subjects Friends [0] [1,10] [11,15] [16,37] [38,50] Choice of Friends
[0] 35.23 16.75 38.65 11.04 16.56 13.19 20.55 17.02
[1,10] 15.54 16.97 24.16 24.16 19.46 13.42 18.79 17.76
[11,15] 13.99 17.44 37.50 20.14 9.72 10.42 22.22 17.19
[16,37] 13.99 17.19 31.39 14.60 10.95 10.22 32.85 21.21
[38,50] 21.24 17.83 28.39 11.86 13.56 19.07 27.12 21.39
Approximate quintiles based on choices for nameless partners (anonymous).
27Table 8: Correlation in baseline altruism among direct friends (helping game)
Nameless Percent of Average # of Distribution of Friends’ Types (percent) Avg. Nameless HG
HG Choice Subjects Friends [0] [1,5] [6,12] [13,15] [16,30] Choice of Friends
[0] 19.61 12.16 20.49 21.79 22.11 26.02 9.59 9.07
[1,5] 20.39 12.36 19.88 20.77 16.02 32.34 10.98 9.66
[6,12] 19.35 12.72 20.24 16.07 20.54 30.95 12.20 9.87
[13,15] 30.13 12.27 15.84 21.58 20.59 31.49 10.50 9.83
[16,30] 10.52 12.36 15.57 19.53 21.64 27.97 15.30 10.34
Approximate quintiles based on choices for nameless partners (anonymous).
Table 9: Regressing average allocation to partners from direct friends on baseline altruism
Helping-Game
(1) (2)
Partner’s Nameless Decision   [1,5] 1.048 0.357
(1.02) (0.96)
Partner’s Nameless Decision   [6,12] 3.074 0.545
(0.93)   (0.91)
Partner’s Nameless Decision   [13,15] 4.567 0.521
(0.92)   (0.98)
Partner’s Nameless Decision   [16,30] 5.275 -0.384
(1.17)   (1.27)
Decision-Maker’s Nameless Choice -0.474
(0.054)  
Const. 9.747   7.679  
(0.73)   (0.73)  
Obs. 549 549
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a partner’s average allocation in anonymous
treatment from decisions made by friends.
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